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Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that
these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy making. Yet
little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In
this paper we consider this issue analytically, and develop a model of policy making in which
multiple sources of information – from the bureaucracy, an interest group, or a legislature’s
own in-house development – can be brought to bear on policy. Lobbyists begin this process
by selecting a venue – Congress or a standing bureaucracy – in which to press for a policy
change. The main ﬁndings of the paper are that self-selection of lobbyists into different policy
making venues can be informative per se; that this self-selection can make legislatures willing
to delegate more authority to ideologically distinct bureaucratic agents; and that delegation of
authority, while it takes advantage of agency expertise, can nevertheless lead to an increase
in the legislature’s own in-house information gathering (e.g., hearings). Changes within the
Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s are reinterpreted in the context of our model.
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11 Introduction
The complexities of policy making in industrialized societies, and the informational demands this
complexity places on policy makers, are apparent and well known to observers of the policy pro-
cess. Indeed, some of the most important and conspicuous institutions we observe in the American
policy process – legislative committee structure, bureaucratic agencies, interest group lobbying –
have been interpreted and rationalized in the scholarly literature as devices that elected policy mak-
ers use to acquire information and expertise, or leverage it for use in policy making. For example,
congressional committees as well as interest groups have been cast as providers of information be-
fore legislation is enacted.1 Bureaucratic agencies have been presented as sources of the same kind
of policy-relevant expertise, making use of it after the enactment of enabling statutes in standard
models of delegation.2
In each case the informational view of these institutions has generated an entire literature that
has been both interesting and important in understanding the role of different institutions in making
policy, and the possibility that the patchwork process they create might nevertheless be reasonably
good at reﬂecting available expertise. On the other hand, what is not clear is how these institutions
ﬁt together as information providers in the policy process – not as a series of individual pieces on
“Congress and ,” but as an integrated whole.3 How these institutions interact with each other,
or whether their roles in interaction match the functions they play when they are considered in
isolated pairs, is potentially important. For example, the ability to infer that greater discretion for
administrative agencies implies greater ideological afﬁnity with the legislature (and presumably,
1Gilligan and Krehbiel [1987], [1990] and Krehbiel [1991] present committees as devices for in-house expertise
development in legislatures. Austen-Smith [1987], Ainsworth [1993], Ainsworth and Sened [1993], Austen-Smith
and Wright [1994], and Kollman [1998] advance related views of informational lobbying, where groups provide
information about policy consequences or constituent preferences and salience.
2Bawn [1995] and Epstein and O’Halloran [1994], [1999] developed a basic modeling framework for studying
discretion, preferences, and expertise in bureaucratic agencies.
3Needless to say, there are important paradigms on the interaction of legislatures, agencies, and interest groups in
the policy process, notably McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast [1987], [1987]; McCubbins and Schwartz [1984]; and the
harried but durable idea of “iron triangles” or subgovernments. But these views do not emphasize the role of all these
institutions as simultaneous providers of information to elected policy makers, which is one of our points in this paper.
2therefore, greater ﬁdelity to public preferences in administrative policy making) rests on models in
which the bureaucracy is the primary source of information available to the legislature.
The information provided when these institutions interact is the issue we address in this paper.
We begin our analysis with a lobbyist’s choice of whether to seek desired policy outcomes through
legislative enactment or agency rules.4 The reason for this starting point is the pervasive diffusion
of policy making authority in the United States across branches of government, a major trend in
public policy over the last century.5 This diffusion means that in many cases, new policy proposals
of broad scope can be advanced either by the legislature, or by a bureaucracy with a corps of
lawyers skilled in ﬁnding the requisite authority in enabling statutes. This diffusion creates a
nontrivial “venue choice” problem for lobbyists: the ﬁrst decision about legislative lobbying for a
well-informed interest group in such a world is whether to do it at all, when the bureaucratic venue
may be more sanguine about some desired policy change. Rational choice by lobbyists combined
with asymmetric information implies that venue choice per se, as distinct from the content of any
messages sent to the chosen venue, is potentially informative. One of our purposes is to ﬂesh out
when this is true; therefore, while there are many opportunities for information transmission in
lobbying, we focus on the information revealed simply by the decision of whom to lobby.
Because of this informative self-selection into venues, the model reveals an interesting insight
regarding the legislature’s incentive to cede discretion to expert bureaucrats. On top of the policy
gains that might be achieved through agency expertise exceeding the legislature’s, the legislature
has an incentive to delegate discretionary authority in order to achieve informational gains when
the legislature itself is lobbied — i.e., precisely when the discretion granted is not used by the
bureau on the path of play. The mere existence of an agency with policymaking powers offers in-
4The model and theory presented in this paper could just as easily be viewed as applying to adjudications as well
as rules, and indeed to the many more subtle, less structured ways in which agencies make policy (e.g., interpretive
statements, regulatory compliance reviews, etc.). We focus our substantive discussion upon agency rules for ease of
exposition. There are interesting implications in distinguishing between the this and other forms of agency policy
making, however. For example, the procedural requirements that an agency must satisfy for other routes to policy
making are much less stringent than when implementing policy through rulemaking.
5Diffusion across levels of America’s federal structure are similarly notable, but not our focus in this paper.
3formation about the (state-contingent) preferences of those groups that circumvent the bureaucracy
and directly lobby the legislature. This information is helpful in the sense that it allows the leg-
islature to inform and involve itself in the business of speciﬁc policymaking in situations when it
might not appear valuable, if the venue of the bureaucracy were not available to the interest group.
Moreover, for this information to be revealed at all requires that the agency’s preferences be dis-
tinct from the legislature’s (less can be learned in important classes of equilibria if the bureaucrat’s
preferences perfectly match the legislature’s), giving the legislature an incentive to drive an ideo-
logical wedge between it and the bureaucracy. This rationale for preference divergence only holds
up if the agency in question can actually be lobbied, an observable implication to which we return
later in the paper in discussing the Federal Trade Commission.
This result is in contrast to the “ally principle,”6 that legislatures will prefer delegating to agents
with policy prerferences “close” to their own over agents with preferences “further away” — one
of the more robust results in recent theoretical advances in delegation (especially Epstein and
O’Halloran [1994], [1999] and Bendor and Meirowitz [2004]). Another important result in this
literature is that a legislature will delegate more authority to expert bureaucrats when the legisla-
ture is relatively less informed about the consequences of policy. In other words, in the standard
framework, policy expertise in the bureaucracy is a substitute for policy expertise in the legisla-
ture. This result also fails in interesting cases in our model. This occurs when lobbyists bypass the
bureaucratic venue and lobby the legislature in a set of states of the world over which the legisla-
ture’s utility is relatively sensitive. Legislative lobbying in such an equilibrium essentially signals
the importance of “doings things right” to the legislature, causing it to invest in information and
make informed policy — even though an expert bureaucrat also has the authority and information
to make it by assumption. The reason this lobbying is informative is that the group could have cho-
sen a different venue but did not. Therefore without the possibility of bureaucratic policy making,
6Cf. Bendor and Meirowitz [2004], not to be confused with the result of the same name in the theoretical lobbying
literature.
4separation of interest group types by venue would not be as informative, and legislative lobbying
would not provide a clear signal of sensitivity to the state.
In short, the interaction of multiple institutions in the policy process has important implications
for the informational roles they each can play in that process, and therefore how we interpret their
existence and structure — both positively and normatively. The rest of our argument is organized
as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical model and characterizes results in terms of different
classes of equilibria that may result. Section 3 analyzes some examples and intuition of key ﬁnd-
ings on the effect of these multiple information sources on political control of bureaucracy. Section
4 interprets several notable changes in the Federal Trade Commission in the 1970s in light of the
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
In our model, there are three players: a group G, a bureaucrat B, and a legislator L. The set of
players is N = fG;B;Lg. The space of possible policies is denoted by X. In addition, there is
a set of states, S. The state is assumed to be realized according to a distribution with cumulative
distribution function F and probability density (or mass, if S is ﬁnite) function f possessing full
support on S. Each players’ payoffs depend on both states and policies. In particular, the payoff
of player i is denoted by ui : X £ S ! R. We assume that both X and S are metric spaces, and
that, for a given state s, each player i’s preferences are single-peaked in the sense that there exists
a unique policy x¤
i(s) such that ui(x¤
i(s);s) ¸ ui(x;s) for all policies x in X. We refer to this
policy as player i’s conditional ideal point. We also assume that there is a status quo policy y in
effect at the start of the game.
We assume that while G and B know the state s, L can ﬁnd out the state only by incurring
an exogenously ﬁxed cost c ¸ 0.7 We take this approach in order to make the implications of
7This is in contrast to recent theoretical work by Sloof [1998] in which the bureaucracy can be informed about the
true state of nature by the lobbyist, and the bureaucracy has a greater degree of information than does the legislature
5asymmetric information more transparent. In an attempt to retain the link between the model and
the intended application, we sometimes refer to the choice by the legislature to incurring the cost
as choosing to “hold hearings.”
Upon realization of the state s according to F, the group chooses whether to lobby the bureau-
crat, the legislator, or neither. If the group chooses to lobby the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat must
choose a policy in X based on her knowledge of s, and the game concludes.8 If the group lobbies
the legislator, then the legislator must choose whether to incur the cost c to ﬁnd out the true state.
Following this decision, the legislator updates its beliefs and chooses any policy in X, and the
game concludes. If the group lobbies neither B nor L, the status quo y remains in force and the
game concludes. The informational structure and payoff functions of all of the players are assumed
to be common knowledge. The game form is displayed in Figure 1.
It is worth commenting on several aspects of the extensive form. First, neither B nor L can
change the status quo policy y unless G requests review of the policy in that venue. While this sort
of “activational lobbying” might seem at ﬁrst glance to sacriﬁce too much realism for simplicity,
we believe that it accurately reﬂects the reality of many policy areas as well as satisfying a type
of external consistency. In particular, this is consistent with the presumption that the legislature
should have no reason to suspect that an alternative policy is better than the status quo unless it
receives some signal of a change in the state of the world. Otherwise, why wouldn’t the legislature
have changed the status quo policy earlier? Our conceptualization of lobbying is informational in
the sense that the lobbyist’s behavior provides one such signal.9 Of course, legislatures certainly
can change preferences or beliefs, and subsequently policy, without lobbyist intervention; these
are simply branches of a larger extensive form policy making game that are beyond the scope of
this paper. Second, it is possible to analyze an extensive form with less initiative power for G, by
about the motivations of the lobbyist.
8That is, for simplicity, we examine the case where the bureaucrat is given full discretion by the legislature.
9Moreover, much of the intuition for the key ﬁndings is valid if there is more informational content to lobbying,
such as a declaration of the lobbyist’s private information. Therefore, we prefer the more minimal interpretation of






















Figure 1: A Model of Policy Making and Venue Choice
assuming that L may alter y in case G elects not to lobby. This changes the expression of sorting
conditions in the equilibria below, but does not overturn any key intuition. Third, a natural question
is what happens if the group can lobby in both venues. This would require speciﬁcation of which
venue actually has authority if both are “activated,” and the legislature seems like a reasonable
choice based on constitutional supremacy. But in that case lobbying both venues really amounts to
lobbying the legislature in our framework.10
OurnotionofequilibriumisperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE).Accordingly, theplayershave
beliefs about each others’ strategies as well as the true state s along all possible paths of the game
10Another natural question then is why a group would ever lobby both venues. This would seem to suggest un-
certainty about which if either venue will actually act on policy if activated. Such uncertainty seems important but is
qualitatively distinct from the issues of informativeness of venue choice and bureaucratic control that we analyze in
this paper.
7tree. Each players’ beliefs about the others’ strategies are required to be correct along any path
of play that is reached with positive probability in a PBE. The key use of the beliefs in our model
is by L, who must infer the states s in which the group approaches her instead of the bureaucrat.
These beliefs determine whether L should incur the cost of obtaining knowledge of the true state s
and, if not, what policy it should set. In a PBE, these beliefs will depend on the strategies chosen
by the group and the bureaucrat and, hence, will depend on both F and the status quo policy, y.
The strategy of L is then a probability of gathering information, pL, and a mapping ¾L from
0[S into probability distributions over X. In particular, L chooses a possibly mixed strategy over
the space of possible policies based on whether it incurred the cost to ﬁnd out the state, s. Let
¾L(0) represent the strategy of L when it does not procure the information. For all states s, ¾L(s)
represents the probability distribution over X conditional on L procuring the information in state
s. The strategy of the bureaucrat is simply a mapping, ¾B from S into probability distributions
over X. The strategy of the group is a mapping ¾G from S into ¢, where ¢ is the 2 dimensional




G(s)), representing the probability with which the group will lobby the
legislator, lobby the bureaucrat, and lobby neither, respectively, conditional on the realization of
the state, s.
Conditional upon the group lobbying the legislator, the legislator’s beliefs are a probability
distribution over S, denoted by ¹. We do not deal with the other players’ beliefs, as they will place
probability one on the true state s in any PBE, given our assumed informational structure.


















8The bureaucrat’s expected utility, conditional on being lobbied by the group, is




The legislator’s expected utility, conditional on being lobbied by the group, choosing to pay the
cost c and ﬁnding out the true state s, is




The legislator’s expected utility, conditional on being lobbied by the group and choosing not to
procure information, is







We are now in a position to deﬁne a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. We denote the set
of probability distributions over X by P(X).
Deﬁnition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a strategy proﬁle (¾¤;p¤
L) and posterior
beliefs ¹ such that
² 8s, ¾¤
G(s) 2 argmax®2¢ vG(®;¾¡G;s)
² 8s, ¾¤
B(s) 2 argmax¯2P(X) vB(¯;¾¡B;s)
² 8s, ¾¤
L(s) 2 argmax°2P(X) vL(1;°;¾G;¾BjaG = L)
² ¾¤
L(0) 2 argmax±2P(X) vL(0;±;¾G;¾BjaG = L)
9² pL 2 argmax½2[0;1] ½
R









Otherwise ¹ is any probability distribution on S.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that uL(x;s) is a strictly concave function of x for all
s 2 S. This assumption is consistent with many models of delegation in political settings and
implies that equilibrium values of ¾L(zj0) will be degenerate distributions (i.e., pick out some
policy, denoted by ~ xL, with probability 1). This assumption simpliﬁes the exposition greatly.
Equilibrium values of ¾L(s) are straightforward – given that the legislator knows the state, she
just picks her most preferred policy, given s. The interesting parts of the legislator’s problem are
the probability of buying information, p, and the choice of policy when the state is not known with
certainty: ¾L(0). These elements of the legislator’s strategy determine the lobbyist’s incentives.
Similarly, the equilibrium values of ¾B(s) are straightforward: the bureaucrat simply implements
its most preferred policy, x¤
B(s), if lobbied by the group.
The logic of any equilibrium strategy for the group is simple. Given the strategies of the
bureaucrat and the legislator, if lobbying either the bureaucrat or the legislator will result in a
policy that makes the group at least as well of as the status quo policy, then the group should lobby
the one whose policy will result in the group being most well off.
The following conditions summarize the conditions for lobbying and who will be lobbied in
any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We denote the equilibrium strategy of player i 2 fL;B;Gg by
¾¤
i and the equilibrium probability of monitoring by the legislator by p¤
L. The group’s behavior in
any PBE is
² uG(y;s) ¸ max[p¤
LuG(x¤
L(s);s) + (1 ¡ p¤
L)uG(~ xL;s);uG(x¤
B(s);s)]
Group does not lobby
² p¤
LuG(x¤
L(s);s) + (1 ¡ p¤






L(s);s) + (1 ¡ p¤
L)uG(~ xL;s)]
Group lobbies bureaucrat
It follows immediately that, in any PBE, the legislator will choose p¤










Equation 1 implicitly deﬁnes two regions of strict preference – one in which the legislator realizes
that incurring the cost of discerning the true state is not offset by the gains from being able to
impose her most preferred policy with probability 1 and another in which the legislator realizes that
the gains from being informed outweigh the costs of becoming informed. Given our assumption
that uL is strictly concave, this second case is more likely if the groups that lobby the legislature11
are sufﬁciently heterogeneous. In substantive terms, we should expect hearings to be held when
the expected beneﬁts from choosing the optimal policy outweigh the costs of holding hearings.
Conversely, equilibria in cases in which the legislature’s preferences are weak compared to the cost
of holding hearings will be characterized by the legislature setting policy without holding hearings
when lobbied. We discuss each of these cases below in more detail, as well as the knife-edge case
of indifference by the legislature.
The immediate question, then, is which groups will lobby the legislature. Given that an in-
formed legislature must choose its most preferred policy in equilibrium and an uninformed legis-
lature can not condition its choice on the true state, the answer to this question depends on whether
the legislature incurs the cost to gather information regarding the true state, s. We now present
the analysis of this model in three parts, corresponding to the legislature always incurring the cost
(i.e., p¤
L = 1), mixing (p¤
L 2 (0;1)), and never incurring the cost (p¤
L = 0). We refer to these as
“perfect monitoring,” “incomplete monitoring,” and “no monitoring,” respectively.
11This set of groups may be represented as the subset of S, SL, that leads to the group lobbying the legislature (i.e.,
¤L = fs 2 S : ¾1
G(s) > 0g.
112.2 Perfect Monitoring
If the legislature always learns the true state, then the groups that lobby the legislature will be only
those groups who prefer the legislature’s conditional ideal point to both the conditional ideal point
of the bureaucrat and the status quo. We refer to equilibria in which the legislature always learns
the true state as perfect monitoring PBE (PM-PBE). The following proposition summarizes the
behavior of the lobbyist in such equilibria.
Proposition 1 Consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (¾¤;p¤
L), with p¤
L = 1 and supporting
posterior beliefs ¹. The lobbyist’s strategy, ¾¤
G, satisﬁes the following condition:
¾
¤1



























Simply put, perfect monitoring will only occur if the groups that lobby (this may be an empty
set) generally indicate that the legislature can greatly increase its own payoff relative to (1) the
status quo, and (2) any policy chosen in ignorance of the true state. Substantively, this implies
that the legislature will have an incentive to hold hearings whenever the set of groups that lobby
the legislature do not allow the legislature to pin down the true state and when lobbyists’ desires
to change the status quo coincide strongly enough with the legislature’s desires to change it as
well. In other words, while the status quo may generally be suboptimal from the legislature’s
perspective, neglecting the information gathering cost c, lobbying will result in monitoring only
when lobbying generally (i.e., in expectation) indicates that the status quo is suboptimal “enough”
12to justify the costs of information gathering. Simultaneously, in a PM-PBE, the array of groups that
support the rational procurement of information by the legislature in a PM-PBE must each prefer
the legislature’s conditional ideal policy to both the status quo and the conditional ideal policy of
the bureaucrat.
The bureaucrat plays a subtle role in this analysis. In particular, B affects the legislature’s deci-
sion to gather information or not through the selection effect that induces on the group’s behavior.
In other words, the bureaucracy’s preferences affect venue choice by determining which groups
lobby the legislature. Given that the lobbyist chose not to lobby the bureaucracy, the legislature is
able to infer something about the true state of nature, since the lobbyist must prefer the policy that
the legislature will choose.12
To support perfect monitoring equilibria, the agency must be lobbied by the group in enough
states of nature that the legislature considers unimportant – otherwise, the legislature may not be
able to justify the decision to hold hearings. This set of states of nature is an increasing function
of the cost of holding hearings, ceteris paribus. In other words, perfect monitoring equilibria are
harder to support when the cost of holding hearings is high and such equilibria may require that
the group lobbies the agency when the legislature’s preferences over policy are weak. Feature 4 is
related to the support of perfect monitoring equilibria. Namely, when the agency is a perfect agent
for the legislature (i.e., the agency’s preferences are identical to the legislature’s), there is no strict
incentive for the group to choose one venue over the other in a perfect monitoring equilibrium.
Thus, supporting the hearing decision of the legislature can require a delicate sorting by the group
of the states of nature – a sorting for which there is no strict incentive at any given point in time.
Roughly speaking, perfect monitoring is supported in equilibrium only if an appropriate sorting
condition is satisﬁed. The sorting condition states that the groups who lobby the legislature repre-
12Strictly speaking, this conclusion is true if the legislature and bureaucrat are each using a pure strategy in the
equilibrium under consideration. Otherwise, the legislature may choose a policy that is less preferred by the lobbyist
than one that may have been chosen by the bureaucrat. In this case, the legislature can only infer that the expected
value of the legislature’s strategy to the lobbyist is greater than the expected value of the bureaucrat’s strategy. This is,
of course, still informative in many settings.
13sent a state of nature offering a signiﬁcant increase in the legislature’s payoff by implementation
of the legislature’s ideal policy “more often” than they represent a state in which the legislature’s
potential gain from altering policy does not justify the cost of holding hearings. Satisfaction of the
sorting condition (and hence, perfect monitoring by the legislature) is made easier in the presence
of venue choice because the group can lobby the agency in situations when the legislature does not
have enough incentive to make informed policy.
This analysis also sheds light on the responsiveness of a legislature to lobbyists. Clearly, the
legislature is lobbied in a PM-PBE only if the lobbyist suspects that the group and the legislature
shareacommonalityofinterest(greaterthanthecommonalityofinterestbetweenthegroupandthe
bureaucrat), namely that they both prefer some alternative policy to the status quo, given the true
state. Policy changes that occur as a result of lobbying and the ensuing hearings should please the
lobbyist not because the legislature is “captured” by the lobbyist. Rather, a rational lobbyist asks
for hearings only when he or she expects that the legislature’s most preferred policy will make the
lobbyist better off than the status quo. In other words, legislative hearings should result in policy
changes and these changes do not necessarily represent legislative hand-outs to the lobbyist.
2.3 Occasional Monitoring
In a PBE with the legislature utilizing a mixed strategy, she randomly decides to incur the cost with
probability p¤
L 2 (0;1). We refer to such an equilibrium as an occasional monitoring PBE, or OM-
PBE. As mentioned earlier, the legislature will only do so in equilibrium if the conditional expected
utility of imposing the optimal policy in the absence of information is equal to the conditional
expected utility of imposing the optimal policy with perfect information (e.g., ¡c). Formally,











14Obviously, this equality is difﬁcult to satisfy in the sense that it will generally require a delicate
balancing of the lobbyist’s lobbying behavior.13 Moreover, holding c constant, satisfaction of this
equality is made more difﬁcult when the legislature’s preferences are highly sensitive to s. Put an-
other way, mixed strategy equilibria are less plausible when the legislature cares a great deal about
“getting it right.” It seems far-fetched that legislators are indifferent between acquiring expertise
and setting policy blindly when lobbied by an interest group. If this supposition is true, then the
lobbyist is never surprised by the legislature’s decision to acquire expertise or not. In other words,
legislators must be indifferent about holding hearings in order for a random decision to hold/not
hold hearings to be a best response by the legislature. As long as legislators are not indifferent, an
interest group that lobbies the legislature will correctly forecast the amount of attention paid to the
interest group by the legislature upon being lobbied.
2.4 No Monitoring
We have considered equilibria in which the legislature ﬁnds out the true state s with positive proba-
bility. In such equilibria, there is generally a degree of concordance between the preferences of the
legislature and any group that chooses to lobby it. This general tendency is of course driven by the
fact that, in equilibrium, the group recognizes that the legislature will impose its own conditional
ideal policy if it decides to ﬁnd out the true state. What if the legislature’s equilibrium strategy is
to never ﬁnd out the true state (i.e., p¤
L = 0)? We now consider this ﬁnal type of PBE, which we
refer to as no monitoring PBE (NM-PBE).
In a NM-PBE, the legislature’s strategy is simply a distribution over X. By the assumption that
uL is strictly concave, any best response is a degenerate distribution (i.e., a pure strategy). Thus,
the set of NM-PBE can be divided into two types, one of which involves the legislature employing
a “conservative” strategy in which no hearings are held and the status quo is upheld, and the
13While mixing lacks some credibility in this instance, the story behind a mixed legislative strategy is (as always)
more compelling once one recognizes that the randomization by the legislator could be accomplished by external
signals.
15second of which involves the legislature changing policy unilaterally without holding hearings
to some policy other than status quo. We analyze these types of equilibria in order, since they are
substantively different. Lobbying the legislature is ineffective in the ﬁrst case but not in the second.
In general, L will not be able to respond to the exact state of nature in either type of NM-PBE,
but there are exceptions to this. In particular, when the group lobbies the legislature if and only
if a speciﬁc state of nature occurs, or in a set of states over which the legislature’s induced ideal
policy is constant, then legislative information acquisition is unnecessary in equilibrium because
venue choice per se is perfectly informative. This is a very special case, however, and so we do
not analyze it further. But it does highlight another potential informational advantage offered to
the legislature by the group’s venue choice.
We now consider the two types of NM-PBE’s in turn.
Unresponsive Legislature. In the ﬁrst type of NM-PBE, ~ x¤
L = y: having been lobbied but not
acquiring information beyond that conveyed by lobbying, the legislature does nothing. Such equi-
libria could involve the group never lobbying the legislature on the path of play, preferring to lobby
the bureaucracy or not at all. Lobbying the legislature is completely ineffective in such an equilib-
rium. In a NM-PBE in which ~ x¤
L = y, the group will never strictly prefer lobbying the legislature
to not lobbying at all, so if there exists any such NM-PBE (¾¤;0) in which ¾¤1
G (s0) > 0 for some s0,
there also exists an NM-PBE (^ ¾¤;0) in which the strategies are identical, with the exception that
^ ¾¤1
G (s0) = 0 and ^ ¾¤3
G (s0) = ¾¤3
G (s0)+¾¤1
G (s0). Supposing that lobbying the legislature is costlier than
notlobbyingatall(whichseemshighlyplausibleifbeyondastrictreadingofthemodel), thenthere
exist no NM-PBE in which the group lobbies the legislature (i.e., 9s 2 S such that ¾¤1
G (s) > 0)
and the legislature does nothing (~ x¤
L = y). Simply put, costly lobbying will not be observed in
equilibrium unless the lobbyist expects a change in policy to result from the lobbying.14
The plausibility of such equilibria depends upon the legislature’s incentives. The legislature
14Though the change need not come from direct legislative action: lobbying the legislature may serve as a means of
advertising the group’s resources, inﬂuencing judicial or agency decisions, or maintain a reputation for use with future
legislatures and/or policy decisions.
16must suspect that “many” of the lobbyists who lobby the legislature in equilibrium signal states of
nature in which the conditional expected utility of y is not low enough to justify the cost of holding
hearings and that y is the policy that maximizes the legislature’s expected utility, conditional upon
being lobbied in equilibrium. In other words, the legislature believes that being lobbied is just
“business as usual” and offers no new information.
Responsive Legislature. The more interesting NM-PBE involve the legislature altering policy
from the status quo y upon being lobbied: ~ x¤
L 6= y. Here the simple fact that the legislature is
lobbied conveys enough information to induce it to change the status quo (contrast this with the
information lobbying offers in a PM-PBE: there L learns that its preferences are sensitive enough
to s that it should acquire expertise). By considering the legislature’s beliefs and best responses
in any NM-PBE, it follows that the legislature must obtain at least as great a conditional expected
utility from the ~ x¤









Thus, in substantively interesting NM-PBE there are at most two classes of groups from the legis-
lature’s perspective: those who lobby the legislature and those who lobby the bureaucracy or don’t
lobby at all. The (possibly empty) class of groups that lobby the legislature are effectively sending
a signal that implies that the legislature, in expectation, would prefer to change the status quo. This
is informative lobbying in its most minimal form. It obviously allows for an “informational” form
of free-riding, and this is what prevents the legislature from being able to respond to the exact state
s in general in such an equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, while the legislature prefers the new policy ~ x¤
L to
the status quo conditional upon being lobbied in such a PBE, this preference is only in expectation.
Frequently in such equilibria, the legislature may have a strict preference for the status quo ex post
and still implement ~ x¤
L. States for which this is true are examples of types of groups that free ride
on the groups for which this is not the case.
17Policy changes resulting from lobbying and not requiring information acquisition by L are of
a “ﬁre alarm” variety: the legislature has a set policy that it implements whenever lobbied in such
an equilibrium. Furthermore, the groups that lobby the legislature in such equilibria may be of two
classes: groups who lobby thelegislaturewhen this pre-programmedresponse is inthe legislature’s
ex post interest, and those that lobby despite the policy making L worse off ex post. The set of the
ﬁrst of these two types (the legislature’s “allies”) must be nonempty for this type of equilibria to
be observed.
Legislative action that follows without expertise acquisition by L can only be supported when
the legislature has a credible belief that it is likely being lobbied by an “ally,” though this does not
eliminate the possibility that other groups may free ride on the allies’ behaviors. The result also
implies that, if the legislature does not hold hearings and changes the policy without additional
information, the lobbyist should not be surprised by the policy chosen by the legislature in equilib-
rium. Again, failure of predictions to be correct can only be supported in mixed strategy equilibria,
which we have ruled out for reasons described above.
Intuitively, the legislature changing policy without hearings is supportable in equilibrium only
so long as a policy exists that is relatively “free ride-proof” in the sense that few groups lobby
the legislature (knowing that they will receive this policy) when the legislature does not beneﬁt
from the policy change. In other words, a policy can be supported as a blind policy change in
equilibrium only if the conditional likelihood that the legislature will like this policy if the group
does is sufﬁciently high.15
3 Analysis
In this section, we examine the effect of the expert bureaucrat on the acquisition of expertise by the
legislature, and the applicability of the ally principle (Bendor and Meirowitz [2004]) within our
15Actually, the point is more subtle than this, because the legislature must recognize that the agency might be
offering a “better deal” to some groups in this case.
18model. The discussion is centered around two (related) examples, which we now present.
3.1 Congressional Hearings
The ﬁrst example is concerned with the frequency of Congressional hearings or information acqui-
sition, as a function of whether Congress has delegated authority to an agency.
Example 1 (Congressional Hearings) Suppose that X = < (i.e., policy choices are real num-
bers), with status quo y = 0. The set of states of nature is S = f¡2;¡1;1;2g and the leg-
islature’s cost of procuring information is c = 2. The legislature’s utility function is given by
uL(x;s) = ¡(x ¡ 0:9s)2, the interest group’s is given by uG(x;s) = ¡(x ¡ s)2, and the bu-
reaucracy’s is given by uB(x;s) = ¡(x ¡ s=jsj)2. Each agent’s state-conditional ideal point and





-2 -1.8 -2 -1 0.1
-1 -0.9 -1 -1 0.4
1 0.9 1 1 0.4
2 1.8 2 1 0.1
Table 1: Conditional Ideal Points and Distribution of States of Nature
monitoring equilibrium when the agency can be lobbied by the group (that is, when delegation has
occurred).
The agency will implement its state-conditioned ideal policy whenever it is lobbied. Accord-
ingly, suppose that the group will lobby the bureaucrat if the state of nature is either 1 or ¡1 and
lobby the legislature otherwise (if the state of nature is ¡2 or 2). It can be veriﬁed that the group’s
decision to lobby the agency when s 2 f¡1;1g is a best response (the agency and the group have
identical preferences in these states of nature). Given this strategy by the group, the legislature’s
optimal behavior is to hold hearings when lobbied and then choose its state-conditioned ideal pol-
icy. Toseethis, notethatiftheinterestgrouplobbiesthelegislatureifandonlyifthestateiseither 2
19or ¡2, then the legislature has an incentive to procure information. This is because the legislature’s
optimal policy choice without holding hearings is the status quo y = 0. However, the conditional
expected utility of not holding hearings and choosing policy equal to 0 is ¡3:24. The conditional
expected utility of holding hearings and then choosing the legislature’s state-conditioned ideal pol-
icy is ¡2. Thus, the legislature should procure information if it is lobbied when the state is either
2 or ¡2. Finally, it can be veriﬁed that the group’s strategy as described above is a best response
to the strategies of the agency and the legislature. Thus, this is a perfect monitoring equilibrium.
Note that the legislature is lobbied, and hence holds hearings, 20% of the time in this equilibrium.
We now examine a modiﬁed version of the game in which the group is unable to lobby the
agency (i.e., delegation has not occurred). If the bureaucrat cannot be lobbied (i.e., delegation did
not occur) then, in any equilibrium16 involving lobbying by the interest group, the legislature never
holds hearings. If the legislature did acquire information when lobbied, the interest group would
have a strict incentive to lobby the legislature in all states. This is because in every state, an in-
formed legislature would alter the policy in such a way as to increase the group’s payoff. However,
the increase in the legislature’s payoffs from informed policy making is not sufﬁcient to compen-
sate it for the cost of holding hearings. To see this, note that the legislature’s expected utility of
not holding hearings and not changing the policy if lobbied is ¡1:296, whereas its expected util-
ity if hearings are held and the legislature’s state-conditioned ideal policy is implemented is ¡2.
Accordingly, without delegation, hearings are never held in this example.
To conclude the example, note that the legislature’s ex ante expected utility of the legislature in
the perfect monitoring equilibrium described ﬁrst is 0:4¤2¤(¡0:01)+2¤0:1¤(¡2) = ¡0:408 and
thelegislature’sexanteexpectedutilitywithoutdelegationis0:4£2£(¡0:81)+2£0:1£(¡3:24) =
¡1:296. Thus, delegation increases the legislature’s expected payoff in this example as well as
increasing the frequency of hearings (hearings held 0% of the time without delegation and 20%
of the time after delegation has occurred). The legislature complements policy expertise in in the
16In this example, and throughout the paper, we focus attention on pure strategy equilibria.
20bureaucracy by developing more policy expertise of its own. 4
In this example the legislature gains from delegation, provided the groups sort themselves in
an informative fashion (the sorting condition discussed in Section 2.2). This demonstrates the
potentially large effects of issue networks and alliances among interest groups within a policy
area. In particular, coordination of lobbying activities across groups can drastically affect the
legislature’s incentive to become informed. If some groups over-lobby the legislature by requesting
hearings when the legislature’s preferences are not highly sensitive to the exact policy chosen, then
the legislature (and the groups as well) may pay the price when the exact choice of policy is very
important. Part of the sorting condition is that groups must not “cry wolf” to the legislature too
often for a perfect monitoring equilibrium to be sustained.
The separation of interest group types in Example 1 offers a natural substantive interpretation.
If we think of the difference between the utility of the status quo and the legislature’s conditional
ideal point as a measure of the importance of the proposed policy changes, then in this equilibrium
the legislature ends up holding hearings about important policy changes and the agency deals with
less important ones. Interestingly, this results in equilibrium rather than from a restriction in the
extensive form – say by limiting the scope of agency policy changes to be more marginal while
allowing the legislature’s to be more sweeping, or subjecting agency policy choices to ex post
legislative review. In the extensive form both the legislature and the agency have access to the
same set of alternative policies. Nevertheless, the more synoptic policy changes are handled by the
legislature in equilibrium while the smaller scale ones are left to the agency, because of the greater
cost it must incur to inform itself about the link between policy choices and outcomes.
Interestingly, in equilibrium the legislature actually develops more policy expertise in the pres-
ence of the expert agency than if the agency had not been created. This point is relevant to the use
of the frequency of oversight hearings as a measure of the effort exerted by the legislature to assert
control over the bureaucracy. In this example, delegation can “cause” increased legislative action
within the agency’s jurisdiction. This increase is actually a desired result of increased agency
21discretion.
3.2 The Ally Principle
The previous subsection discussed the occurrence and role of congressional hearings within our
theory. We now turn to the second example and consider what the theory says regarding the
ally principle of bureaucratic discretion (cf. Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). This result, which
asserts that legislatures delegate less authority to bureaucracies the more their policy preferences
diverge, has been the foundation for much recent theoretical and empirical work on delegation and
discretion.
Example 2 (Ally Principle) This example extends Example 1 by adding an alternative agency –
the question considered is whether the legislature prefers an agency with more similar preferences
to its own or one with more divergent preferences. To do this, we consider two possible agencies,
denoted by B and B0, respectively, and list the state-conditioned ideal points and probability of






-2 -1.8 -2 -1 -1 0.1
-1 -0.9 -1 -1 -0.89 0.4
1 0.9 1 1 0.89 0.4
2 1.8 2 1 1 0.1
Table 2: Conditional Ideal Points and Distribution of States of Nature
to those of the ﬁrst agency, B. If the legislature were to choose one of the two agencies to have
dictatorial control over policymaking, the optimal choice would be B0. (Thus, this example speaks
to the role played by the lack of abdication in legislative delegation.)
We consider the legislature’s ex ante expected utility in two cases: (1) when the agency’s
preferences are given for B and (2) when the agency’s preferences are given for B0. The perfect
monitoring equilibrium for the ﬁrst case (where the agency’s preferences are given by x¤
B(s) in
22Table 2) is described in Example 1. Therefore, we proceed to the second case. In this case it can
be seen that, if the legislature always acquires information when lobbied, then the group’s optimal
strategy is to lobby the legislature in all states of nature and never lobby the bureaucracy. Just
as in the discussion in Example 1, a perfect monitoring equilibrium cannot exist if the agency’s
preferences are given by B0. Thus, the legislature can strictly increase its payoff by delegating to an
agency with preferences less similar to its own than to one with more closely aligned preferences.
4
In order to link the role of hearings and the ally principle, note that the increase in hearings held
in Example 1 is strict and occurs exactly because the agency is sometimes lobbied by the interest
group. In both Examples 1 and 2, the legislature can increase its payoff by delegating authority
to an agency whose preferences differ from its own. Without this divergence of preferences, the
interest groups would have no incentive to sort themselves and support the legislature’s monitoring
decision.
This highlights the importance of abdication as well as delegation in the ally principle. If the
legislature can truly constrain its own authority in the sense of surrendering its rights to make pol-
icy, then the ally principle will once again hold – authority is best surrendered to one’s clone. This
insight is more than a technical point: this means of bringing the Congressional delegation prob-
lem back in line with the ally principle has been explicitly prohibited by the U.S. Supreme Court
in what is known as the non-delegation doctrine. Essentially, Congress is constitutionally bound
not to abdicate its policymaking powers to an unelected body. Therefore, the theory presented here
recognizes an institutional arrangement that is not only theoretically and substantively important –
it is also empirically valid.
234 The Federal Trade Commission
In this section, we present a brief analysis of the Federal Trade Commission, particularly its revi-
talization and eventual reform in the 1970s and 1980s.17 The purpose of this section is to relate
the experiences of the Commission, Congress, and public interest groups to our model and attempt
to show how the model presented here aids in our understanding of the development of relations
between Congress and the bureaucracy. To summarize, after a long period of comparative latency,
the FTC’s policy making authority was expanded while its “ideological distance” from Congress
increased. These two events, at odds under the ally principle, are reconciled in our model provided
that sufﬁcient scope for lobbying the bureaucracy exists. Following the ﬁrst two developments,
this is exactly what Congress took steps to ensure.
The Federal Trade Commission was created as an independent regulatory commission in 1914
in an attempt to enforce antitrust law through the regulation of incipient monopolies. Largely con-
ﬁned to case-by-case policymaking through the 1960s, the Commission was charged with polic-
ing unfair and deceptive trade practices (including a charge to protect consumers’ rights as well
as those of competitors) with the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938. The FTC inherited
the power to regulate deceptive advertising as a compromise between consumer advocates (who
wanted the Food and Drug Administration to hold the authority to regulate advertising) and indus-
try interests (who did not want the FDA to hold the authority, but were generally not opposed to
the idea of regulation otherwise). The FTC remained largely a case-by-case policymaking agency
until the late 1960s. After the passage of the APA in 1946, the FTC promulgated policy mostly
through adjudications against speciﬁc ﬁrms. In 1969, however, two reports (one written by a group
of volunteers organized by Ralph Nader and the other commissioned by the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA)) leveled several criticisms at the FTC, the primary one being that the Commission
was unable or unwilling to enforce its statutes. In addition, the leadership of the Commission was
17Much more depth can be found in the excellent discussions of the FTC in Chapter 5 of Harris and Milkis [1989]
and throughout Fritschler and Hoeﬂer [1995].
24depicted as the mediocre product of a patronage system beneﬁtting southern congressmen (Har-
ris and Milkis [1989], p.164). Both reports called upon the FTC to fulﬁll the role that had been
assigned to it, namely consumer protection.
Following the reports’ publications, President Nixon endorsed the ABA’s report’s ﬁndings and
called for a “reactivation and revitalization of the FTC”(Public Papers of the Presidents, 1969, 887,
cited in Harris and Milkis [1989], p. 167). The actions that followed – for example, the ﬁring by
Casper Weinberger (then a chairman of the Commission) of eighteen of the Commission’s 31 at-
torneys – represented an attempt to create an agency with preferences that were known and distinct
from the preferences then apparently holding sway in Congress. Note that this is not a struggle be-
tween the executive and legislative branches, however: Congress could have blocked these moves
but did not move to do so. In addition, Congress could have achieved the policy outcomes desired
by the new appointees in the absence of the reorganization as well though presumably only at sig-
niﬁcant cost in the form of hearings and debate. Finally, several Congressmen perceived electoral
advantage to ﬂow from being seen as a consumer’s advocate, or at the very least electoral risk was
perceived to stem from actively opposing the American consumer.
Following the shufﬂe at the FTC, the Commission entered a period of decidedly activist poli-
cymaking. Initially, the Commission began more vigorously pursuing enforcement of its statutory
mandate through adjudications, but eventually began issuing industry-wide trade regulation rules.
Regulatory rules are far more effective than adjudications affecting one or a few ﬁrms in terms of
implementing social and economic policy. Thus, the FTC effectively broadened its own discre-
tionary powers between 1969 and 1977.
The FTC’s expansion from case-by-case enforcement of its mandate to more sweeping regula-
tory rulemaking was furthered by the fact that a “beat cop” image of the FTC was unsatisfactory
to members of not only the consumer’s movement, but members of Congress as well. Some found
case-by-case enforcement to be potentially arbitrary and capricious (a concern which could have
been dealt with, in theory at least, under the Administrative Procedure Act) while others, more in
25line with the present discussion, seemed to recognize that rulemaking would result in systematic
policy that could help deﬁne the role of the FTC with regard to individuals’ and ﬁrms’ interests.
Describing adjudicatory policymaking as capricious and ineffective is equivalent to stating that
the FTC’s role in policymaking made it impossible to infer whether lobbying it would be effec-
tive. Indeed, the effectiveness of lobbying an agency whose policymaking is conﬁned to individual
and particular cases is presumably far lower than that of lobbying an agency that promulgates
policy through regulatory rules. In effect, an adjudicatory agency does not effectively serve the
informational purpose of the agency in our model – groups seeking adjudications rarely (if ever)
approached Congress for redress prior to the revitalization, and groups seeking broader reforms
would not ﬁnd lobbying the FTC effective until the Commission undertook rulemaking as a means
of making policy.
The turning point in the FTC’sadoption of rulemaking occurred in 1971, when the Commission
issued a rule requiring that accurate octane levels be posted on gasoline pumps. The Commission’s
authority to issue such an industry-wide rule was challenged in court, with the FTC eventually win-
ning judicial endorsement of its rulemaking authority in National Petroleum Reﬁners Association
v. FTC.18 This authority was soon endorsed by Congress with the passage of the Magnusson-Moss
Act of 1975. The Act not only solidiﬁed the FTC’s policymaking powers with regard to consumer
protection and antitrust matters, it also imposed fairly explicit reporting and procedural require-
ments that the Commission has to satisfy when seeking to implement policy through rulemaking.
For example, the Commission is required, above and beyond the “notice and comment” require-
ments imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, to publicize and provide speciﬁc reasons for
proposed rules, and allow interested parties to ﬁle written reports (including data, opinions, and
statements of support or opposition) with the Commission. Additionally, all material submitted to
the FTC regarding proposed rules was required to be made public (Ellis [1981], p. 162, cited in
Harris and Milkis [1989], p. 173). In general, the opportunity for public participation at the FTC
18National Petroleum Reﬁners Association v. FTC, 482 F 2d 672, D.C. Circuit, 1973.
26was expanded greatly, above what had previously been the case as well as above what was required
of many other agencies whose public participation requirements were limited to those stated in the
APA.
In terms of our model, this expansion of lobbying channels in the bureaucracy is a corollary of
the expansion of FTC activism in the ﬁrst place. The creation by Congress of another policy mak-
ing venue with distinct preferences and essentially independent ability to initiate policy makes no
sense unless that venue can be lobbied. When that venue is approached by lobbyists, it responds
(given legal constraints and administrative structures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast [1987],
[1987], as well as less formal pressures from repeated interaction). And when it is bypassed by
lobbyists, an inference can be made about the urgency of the issue at hand or the appropriate policy
response. With the passage of Magnusson-Moss, Congress not only explicitly endorsed the FTC’s
authority to service interested parties but also enhanced the signal relayed by such groups’ partic-
ipation in the FTC’s rulemaking process. In return for effectively granting legislative authority to
the FTC, Congress extracted an informational gain that could (and would) be used to its advantage
when approached regarding consumer protection and antitrust issues in the future. Bringing this
point even more to forefront was the Act’s authorization of an “intervenor funding program” that
provided ﬁnancial aid to groups that wished to participate in the rulemaking process. This program
was described as a buttress against the possibility of the FTC becoming “captured” by the indus-
tries it was charged with policing. However, both the electoral environment and the environment
within the Commission itself when the Act was passed (1975) makes the possibility of its being
captured by industry interests seem remote at best. Rather, the intervenor funding program seems
more correctly analyzed as a means by which Congress provided a strict incentive for the FTC’s
“clients” – public interest groups – to lobby the Commission rather than the Congress whenever
appropriate. Furthermore, the size of the program in terms of total expenditures was trivial, with
the vast majority of the funds going to a few highly pro-consumer groups. The beneﬁts of this
program, however, were potentially huge, as it essentially let Congress get back to the business
27of things other than consumer legislation, most of which at the time dealt with issues involving
distributed gains and concentrated costs such as advertising on children’s television.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the interaction of multiple institutional actors with policy-relevant
information (or the potential to acquire it). Our argument is that when these institutions all interact
with one another, there are important implications for the informational roles they play in the
policy process — and therefore our interpretation of the form they take. For example, when venue
choice by an informed lobbyist is possible because of diffuse policy making authority, a legislature
may actually have an incentive to delegate to an agent whose preferences do not perfectly reﬂect
its own. The reason is that it can make legislative lobbying more informative, when it happens.
Moreover, delegation to an expert bureaucracy, which presumably would have some roots in the
desire to leverage its informational advantage, can nevertheless lead the legislature to acquire more
information itself.
In addition, supposing that the bureaucracy has lower costs of procuring information (or, more
generally, lower costs of “doing things right”), the legislature can service many types of groups
more efﬁciently because the bureaucracy exists. In particular, the legislature may not have very
strong (or perhaps any) preference between different policies most of the time. Without the bureau-
cracy as a venue, groups lobbying the legislature in this case would get uninformed policymaking
from the legislature. With the inclusion of the bureaucracy, the groups can partially distinguish
themselves at no cost to the legislature. In these cases, the legislature holds hearings about impor-
tantissuesandthebureaucracydealswithlessimportantones. Thisfeatureemergesinequilibrium;
it is not imposed by a restriction on the set of issues the bureaucracy can address (by assumption it
is the same as that for the legislature). Even allowing for the fact that the bureaucracy may become
“captured” by some or all lobbyists that approach it, the increased ability of the legislature to deal
28with important, allied lobbyists can result in an indirect increase in the legislature’s well-being.
This dynamic is similar, in some respects, to a monopolist who offers differentiated products so
that heterogeneous consumers can self-select and reduce the time the monopolist must spend fash-
ioning specialized goods for low demand consumers. Optimal delegation involves a bureaucracy
that is efﬁciently serving the interests of interest groups that the legislature does not consider im-
portant enough relative to the costs of policymaking on those issues, in terms of time taken from
other issues.
The model also raises the point that legislative delegation can be desirable not only because
the agency to whom authority is delegated may be more expert than the legislature itself, but also
because voluntary sorting by lobbyists can increase the incentive for the legislature to acquire
information and make better-informed policy choices when it is lobbied.
There are several directions in which our model could be extended. Perhaps the most important
shortcoming of the present model is the absence of an explicit role of the executive. Clearly the
environment in which the bureaucracy operates is highly complex, involving many different stimuli
that operate at different speeds and with differing effects on a variety of possible bureaucratic
responses. Our model incorporates a stylized version of a single stimulus – namely, lobbying by
an interest group – in an attempt to highlight the informational role that delegation can serve above
and beyond possible direct informational advantages of the agent to whom authority is delegated.
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